Monitoring-Based Key Revocation Schemes for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks: Design and Security Analysis by Katrin Hoeper & Guang Gong B
Monitoring-Based Key Revocation Schemes for Mobile
Ad Hoc Networks: Design and Security Analysis
Katrin Hoeper¤,a, Guang Gongb
aComputer Security Division, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
Gaithersburg, MD 20878, USA
bDepartment of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Waterloo, Waterloo,
Ontario, N2L 3G1, Canada
Abstract
This article proposes a parameterized trust model and security analysis frame-
work for monitoring-based schemes that enables the identi¯cation of mali-
cious nodes in mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) and other decentralized
networks. We utilize these results to design a practical decentralized key
revocation scheme for MANETs in which nodes monitor their neighbors and
securely propagate their observations, where security thresholds ± and " pro-
tect against false accusations from groups of malicious nodes. Our revocation
scheme is the ¯rst of its kind to take the inaccuracy of the underlying mon-
itoring scheme into account. For example, we derive upper bounds for false
positive rate ® and false negative rate ¯ that ensure the functionality and se-
curity of the revocation scheme. By utilizing security parameters ±, ", ® and
¯, we provide an extensive security analysis showing how to select these and
other system parameters to mitigate a wide range of attacks from insiders
and outsiders as well as colluding nodes.
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Due to their versatility, decentralized infrastructure and other unique
properties, there has been a growing interest in mobile ad hoc networks
(MANETs) for military, government and commercial applications. A pri-
mary security challenge in such networks is the likelihood of node compro-
mises caused by weak physical protection and potentially hostile environ-
ments. This means that key revocation mechanisms are essential and nodes
must be capable of instantly verifying whether the key of another node has
been revoked. Because of the decentralized nature of MANETs, revocation
schemes must be based on the nodes' own observations. Initial ideas for
MANET revocation schemes have been outlined elsewhere [14, 21] and, more
recently, a few practical monitoring-based revocation schemes have been pro-
posed [5, 6, 9, 11, 16, 20].
In this article, we introduce a novel parameterized trust model and se-
curity analysis framework for monitoring-based key revocation schemes in
MANETs. This work is the ¯rst to study the impact of the inherent inaccu-
racy of monitoring schemes on the functionality and security of the revocation
scheme itself. Clearly, without considering false positive and false negative
rates, ® and ¯, the analysis of a monitoring-based revocation scheme's re-
silience to collusive attacks (e.g. by unidenti¯ed malicious nodes) becomes
meaningless. For example, we derive upper bounds for ¯ that mitigate col-
lusive attacks. In addition, we demonstrate that only a single threshold ±
may not be su±cient to thwart Sybil attacks, and hence, introduce a second
threshold " as a solution. Additional parameters are propagation range m and
expiry interval ¢T that a®ect the scheme's performance. These parameters
can be selected to reduce the impact of roaming adversaries that are trying
to escape their key revocations. In addition to Sybil and roaming attacks,
our threat model addresses modi¯cation, fabrication, impersonation, battery
exhaustion and replay attacks, as well as several advanced collusive attacks.
The proposed trust model and threat model as well as the derived secu-
rity parameters, parameter relations and boundaries can be easily applied to
any accusation-based revocation scheme and in fact to any monitoring-based
scheme in decentralized networks.
We apply our trust and threat models|with all the above-mentioned se-
curity parameters|to the accusation-based revocation scheme in [10]. We
chose the scheme in [10] because it follows the recent trend of utilizing the ef-
¯cient key management of pairing-based identity-based cryptographic (IBC)
2schemes to secure MANETs [7, 10, 11, 13, 20]. Among the proposed IBC-
based schemes, [10] uniquely provides detailed algorithm descriptions, uti-
lizes two security thresholds, cryptographically protects messages without
the need of computationally demanding digital signatures, enables e±cient
and secure reception of previous accusations, as well as the revocation of
the nodes' own keys. Applying the trust and threat model to the original
scheme helped us to identify several security °aws (not detailed here) and
generate a modi¯ed scheme that addresses all °aws. For example, the origi-
nal scheme required nodes to identify neighbors in m-hop range, which may
be impractical in some applications. This requirement no longer exists in the
revocation scheme presented here. Furthermore, vulnerabilities to replay,
battery exhaustion and roaming attacks, present in the original scheme, are
addressed and numerous extensions to the scheme are presented. As a result,
we describe a practical, completely decentralized accusation-based revocation
scheme for MANETs, together with its security analysis which provide several
parameters to ¯ne-tune the scheme's security and performance, depending
on the application and network environment.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In the next section,
we brie°y review background information and related work. In Section 3,
we discuss the system set-up and trust model. The key revocation scheme is
presented in Section 4 and analyzed in Sections 5 and 6. Finally, we derive
conclusions in Section 7.
2. Background and Related Work
In this section, we brie°y review pairing-based IBC schemes, as well as
existing revocation and monitoring schemes for MANETs.
2.1. Pairing-based IBC Schemes
The ¯rst ID-based encryption scheme from the Weil pairing was intro-
duced by Boneh and Franklin [2]. In the following, we give a de¯nition of
cryptographic bilinear mappings, the building block of any pairing-based IBC
scheme.
Let G1, G2 be two groups of the same prime order q. G1 is as an additive
group, whereas G2 is a multiplicative subgroup of a ¯nite ¯eld. Let P be
an arbitrary generator of G1. Assume that the discrete logarithm problem
(DLP) is hard in G1 and G2. A bilinear mapping ^ e : G1 £ G1 7! G2 must
satisfy the following properties:
3² Bilinearity: ^ e(aP;bQ) = ^ e(P;Q)ab for all P, Q 2 G1 and a, b 2 Z¤
q.
² Non-degeneracy: If P is a generator of G1, then ^ e(P;P) is a generator
of G2. In other words, ^ e(P;P) 6= 1.
² Computable: There exists an e±cient algorithm to compute ^ e(P;Q) for
all P, Q 2 G1.
The security of pairing-based IBC schemes is based on the so-called Bi-
linear Di±e-Hellman Problem (BDHP) [2] which is de¯ned as follows.
De¯nition 1 (Bilinear Di±e-Hellman Problem (BDHP)). Given two
groups G1 and G2 of the same prime order q, a bilinear map ^ e : G1£G1 7! G2
and a generator P of G1, the BDHP is to compute ^ e(P;P)abc 2 G2 for any
a;b;c 2 Z¤
q given (P;aP;bP;cP).
In any IBC scheme, the key generation center (KGC) is responsible to
select the system parameters and set up the system such that the BDH
problem is hard.
2.2. Revocation in MANETs
Despite its importance, many PKI and IBC-based security solutions for
MANETs ignore key revocation or just brie°y outline an idea for a solution
without providing actual algorithms, e.g. [7, 12, 13, 14, 21]. To date only a
few practical and comprehensive revocation schemes for MANETs have been
proposed [5, 6, 9, 11, 16, 20].
The revocation scheme in [6] employs an accusation scheme with threshold
±. Accusations are frequently broadcasted throughout the network. Newly
joining nodes receive the unprotected accusation tables from all other nodes
and accept accusations from senders with su±ciently large trust value, where
trust values depend on the number of accusations a node has made and/or
received and other parameters.
In [5], a revocation scheme for sensor networks with pre-distributed se-
cret keys is presented. Revocations are based on monitoring neighbors but
rather than counting accusation towards a threshold, accusors broadcast se-
cret shares. If more than ± secret shares have been broadcasted, nodes can
reconstruct the secret and thus know that the owner's key is revoked.
Instead of revoking keys, the authors of [16] propose that nodes need to be
reelected by a group of nodes to obtain a new key, where reelection is based
4on observed behavior. Like [5], the reelection mechanism is based on secret
key sharing. To avoid costly secret key reconstructions, the authors in [16]
also outline a lightweight scheme in which nodes periodically broadcasts a
so-called buddy-list with identi¯ers of trusted nodes. A third, very radical
approach in [16] is to revoke the keys of accusor and accused node.
In [20], a distributed on-line KGC consisting of n network nodes (called
D-KGC) carries out key revocations and renewals. The distributed KGC is
implemented using a (k;n)-threshold scheme. Nodes monitor their neighbor-
hood and send their accusations to b assigned D-KGCs. Once a threshold ±
is reached, a group of k D-KGCs collaboratively signs a revocation message.
In [9], nodes predict the behavior of other nodes based on their own
observations and reports from neighbors utilizing a 3-dimensional Dirichlet
distribution. Here nodes can have three di®erent states: trustworthy, suspi-
cious and malicious, which enables nodes to make multilevel responses.
In [11], nodes monitor their neighbors and send their accusations to an m-
hop neighborhood. Accusations are counted towards a ±-threshold, whereas
reported accusations are additionally protected by an "-threshold. Several
features as well as limitations of the scheme have been outlined in Section 1,
and the limitations will be addressed in our revocation scheme in Section 4.
Concluding, none of the discussed revocation scheme considers the false
positive and false negative rates, ® and ¯, of the monitoring scheme which is
crucial for the security analysis of numerous attacks especially by colluding
adversaries.
2.3. Misbehavior Detection Schemes
The following metrics that have been proposed for detecting malicious
nodes in MANETs are suitable for monitoring-based revocation schemes:
² count number of dropped packets [3, 4, 15]
² count number of generated packets [1]
² use anomaly detection systems to detect unusual behavior [19]
² use intrusion detection systems to detect known attacks [15]
Whenever the threshold of the applied metric is reached, the node is
marked as malicious and an accusation message is sent. Similarly, the moni-
toring results can be used to identify honest nodes as necessary in rewarding
schemes [16].
53. System Set Up and Trust Model
In this section, we brie°y describe the system set up, assumptions, no-
tations and key revocation list (KRL) creation of the presented revocation
scheme. Finally, we de¯ne the trust model.
3.1. Set Up IBC Scheme
For the proposed revocation scheme, we assume the existence of a pairing-
based IBC framework. Here, we assume an external KGC for key generation
and distribution. The system set up is the same as described in [11]. In
particular, the IBC scheme has params = hq;G1;G2; ^ e;P;Ppub;H1;H2i as
public parameters, whereas the KGC's long-term private key s, also referred
to as master key, is kept con¯dential. Each node i in the network has a public
key
Qi(tx;vi) = H1(IDijjtxjjvi); (1)
where IDi is the identi¯er of node i, tx the expiry date of the key and vi the
version number of the key. Version numbers start with v = 1 for every new
expiry date tx and are incremented with each key renewal that occurs before
tx. This key format allows instant key renewal [11]. The KGC computes the
private key di = sQi for each node i in the network using the system's master
key s and distributes it to i. Whenever two network nodes i and j wish to
communicate for the ¯rst time, they each compute their pairwise pre-shared
key Kij according to
Kij = ^ e(di;Qj) = ^ e(dj;Qi); (2)
and store the key for future correspondences.
3.2. System Assumptions
The system assumptions for our key revocation scheme can be summa-
rized as follows:
1. bidirectional communication links
2. each node has a monitoring scheme implemented
3. each node i has a unique identity IDi
4. each node knows identities and hop-distance of its one-hop neighbors
6Table 1: List of Notations for Key Revocation Scheme
N, ­ = jNj Set and number of all network nodes
Ni, ­i Node i's perception of set and number of network nodes
N1;i, ¾i = jN1;ij Set and number of i's one-hop neighbors
¾, ­ Average number of one-hop neighbors and network nodes
±;" Thresholds for revocation and reported accusations
m Propagation range of accusation messages
KRL
i(tx) i's key revocation list for keys with expiry date tx
tx, ¢T Expiry date and expiry interval, i.e. tx+1 = tx + ¢T
jx ¡ yj Euclidian distance between two nodes x and y
®;¯ False positive & false negative rates of monitoring scheme
ajjb Concatenation of two binary strings a and b
ci
j Column vector in KRL
i with accusations from node j
ri
j Row vector in KRL
i with accusations against node j
rk Counter for received k-vectors
5. each node i obtains a private and public key pair (di;Qi) from an
external KGC
The ¯rst two assumptions enable nodes to monitor their neighbors in
communication range. We discussed some metrics for monitoring schemes
in Section 2.3 and assume that a suitable scheme is implemented on each
node. Assumptions 3 and 4 are necessary to unambiguously identify network
nodes and one-hop neighbors, respectively. To identify all one-hop neighbors,
a node could scan all nodes in communication range and/or send out hello
messages and wait for replies. Assumption 5 is necessary because crypto-
graphic keys are used for message protection in our revocation scheme. Here
we assume an external o®-line KGC that only distributes keys to nodes that
have successfully authenticated to the KGC and are authorized to join the
network.
3.3. Notations
We need to introduce some notations for our scheme. A summary of
notations and symbols can be found in Table 1. Let N denote the set of all
7network nodes, where ­ = jNj is the number of network nodes. We use ­i
to denote the number of nodes node i currently possesses information about
(such as identity, public key and/or accusation messages from or against
this node) and use Ni to describe the set of these nodes. Note that ­, N,
jOmegai and Ni are all variable due to the dynamic character of MANETs.
R is the communication range for transmitting and receiving messages and
assumed to be constant for all nodes. Furthermore, jx ¡ yj denotes the
Euclidean distance between two nodes x and y. Let N1;i denote i's one-
hop neighbors, i.e. all nodes in immediate communication range of i, with
N1;i = fj : jj ¡ ij · R; 8j 2 Ng. Let ¾i denote the number of i's one-hop
neighbors, i.e. ¾i = jN1;ij. For an easier representation and without loss of
generality, we denote i's one-hop neighbors as j 2 N1;i = f1;:::;¾ig, where
i itself is part of N1;i. Let m denote the propagation range of messages, i.e.
messages sent by a node i reach all nodes in the network that can be reached
by at most m hops (also called m-hop neighborhood).
3.4. Create Key Revocation Lists (KRLs)
Each node i creates a key revocation list KRL
i(tx) for all its known nodes
j 2 Ni. For an easier representation and without the loss of generality, we
assume that Ni = fID1;:::;ID­ig. A key revocation list KRL
i(tx) can be
represented as (­i x (­i + 3))-matrix as shown below
KRL
i(tx) =
0
B
B
B
B
B
@
ai
1;1 ¢¢¢ ai
1;j ¢¢¢ ai
1;­i ID1 vi
1 Xi
1
. . . ... . . . ... . . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
ai
j;1 ¢¢¢ ai
j;j ¢¢¢ ai
j;­i IDj vi
j Xi
j
. . . ... . . . ... . . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
ai
­i;1 ¢¢¢ ai
­i;j ¢¢¢ ai
­i;­i ID­i vi
­i Xi
­i
1
C
C
C
C
C
A
; (3)
in which accusation values are represented as ai
k;j 2 f0;1g with fk;jg 2
f1;:::;­ig. Note that KRL
i(tx) must be adjusted every time ­i changes,
i.e. a new column must be inserted into the matrix for each new node in
Ni. Value ai
k;j indicates that node i \heard" that node j either accuses node
k of malicious behavior (ai
k;j = 1) or believes k is trustworthy (ai
k;j = 0).
The upper index i denotes that values are current values in i's KRL
i. Note
that other nodes l might have di®erent values stored in their revocation lists
KRL
l, e.g. ai
k;j 6= al
k;j for i 6= l in some cases. Discrepancies in accusation
8values may exist, because accusations take di®erent paths and times to prop-
agate through the network. In the remainder, we use KRL
i for short because
we only consider the current expiry interval.
Each j-th column vector in KRL
i for 1 · j · ­i, short ci
j, contains all
accusations ai
k;j made by node j against nodes k 2 Ni. Each j-th row vector
in KRL
i for 1 · j · ­i, short ri
j, corresponds to a node j 2 Ni and contains,
among other information, the accusation values ai
j;k from all nodes k 2 Ni
evaluating node j. In particular, elements 1 to ­i in ri
j contain accusation
values ai
j;1 to ai
j;­i. Element (­i + 1) contains the identity IDj of node j,
element (­i +2) the current version number vi
j of public key Qj(tx), and the
last element (­i + 3) contains a 1-bit °ag Xi
j that, when set, indicates that
node i considers public key Qj of node j as revoked. Node i sets
X
i
j =
8
> > <
> > :
1 if ai
j;i = 1 (Condition 1)
or if ai
j;j = 1 (Condition 2)
or if
P
k ai
j;k ¸ ± 8 k 2 ­i with Xi
k = 0 (Condition 3)
0 else
(4)
Basically, node i considers j's public key as revoked, i.e. Xi
j = 1, if at
least one of Conditions 1-3 is true. Condition 1 describes the case that node i
observed the malicious behavior of node j during its own neighborhood watch
(see Section 4.1.1). Condition 2 covers the case that i received a harakiri
message from j indicating its own private key dj has been compromised (see
Section 4.1.2). And ¯nally, Condition 3 considers the case in which node i
received at least ± accusations against node j from nodes k 2 ­i with Xi
k = 0.
If none of the three conditions applies, node i considers node j and its current
public key Qj(tx;vi
j) as trustworthy, i.e. Xi
j = 0.
When ¯rst creating its key revocation list KRL
i, node i initializes all
accusation values with ai
k;j = 0 for all fk;jg ½ f1;:::;­ig. As a consequence,
all revocation values Xi
j = 0. We assume ¯xed expiry intervals with tx+1 =
tx +¢T, i.e. all values in KRL(tx) are re-set every ¢T. Once an accusation
value ai
k;j is set (i.e. ai
k;j = 1), the value will not be reset to zero until a new
public key Qk(v0;tx) with v0 > vi
j is received or a new time interval t0
x > tx
starts.
3.5. Trust Model
First of all, we assume that the external KGC is honest, not compromised
and trusted by all nodes. In applications where this is di±cult to ensure, a
9distributed KGC can be deployed [2, 7, 13]. Furthermore, the KGC checks
the identities of nodes before they receive their private keys.
We de¯ne malicious nodes as nodes that are either compromised or sel¯sh.
We assume that compromised nodes will engage in some kind of malicious
activities, otherwise these nodes cannot be detected. Sel¯sh nodes, on the
other hand, rather save their energy than forwarding other nodes' packets.
The accuracy of our revocation scheme depends on the employed monitor-
ing scheme, i.e. false positive rate ® and false negative rate ¯. In particular,
® is the ratio of falsely accused nodes to all honest nodes and ¯ is the ratio
of undetected malicious nodes to all malicious nodes. Hence, 0 · ®;¯ · 1,
with typical values ranging from 0:01 ¡ 0:1.
We need the following de¯nitions before we can derive the trust model:
De¯nition 2 (Direct Accusations). Accusations received from one-hop
neighbors containing the result of their neighborhood watch.
For example, node i receives column vector c
j
j from an one-hop neighbor
j 2 N1;i.
De¯nition 3 (Reported Accusations). Accusations received from
one-hop neighbors reporting accusations from nodes in l-hop distance, with
l > 1.
For example, node i receives column vectors c
j
k from an one-hop neighbor
j 2 N1;i, where k 2 N n N1;i.
De¯nition 4 (Trusted Node). Node i trusts all nodes j 2 Ni with Xi
j = 0.
Note that \trust" is not universal in our scheme, trust has to be put in a
relation. For instance, node i trusts node j, whereas another node k might
not trust j.
We are now ready to derive the trust model for our revocation scheme,
in which each node i:
1. trusts that one-hop neighbors j 2 N1;i that have been identi¯ed as ma-
licious in i's neighborhood watch (with ai
j;i = 1) are indeed malicious.
2. accepts direct accusations of any trusted one-hop neighbor j 2 N1;i.
3. accepts the majority vote of reported accusations from a group of at
least " trusted one-hop neighbors.
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Figure 1: Overview Revocation Scheme
4. trusts ± or more accepted accusations (both direct and reported) against
a node j 2 Ni to justify the revocation of j's keys.
From the ¯rst trust assumption it follows that ai
j;i = 1 leads to Xi
j =
1. On the other hand, trust in a node follows that direct and reported
accusations are accepted and counted towards the ± revocation threshold.
Security parameter " ensures that reported accusations have been observed
by a group of trusted one-hop neighbors.
There are some universal bounds for the security parameters, namely
1 · " · ¾i and 1 · ± · ­. We derive tighter bounds in Section 5.
4. Key Revocation Scheme
In this section, we ¯rst present a modi¯ed version of the revocation scheme
in [11] that: 1) removes the requirement for knowing all nodes in m-hop dis-
tance while maintaining an m-hop propagation range; 2) is resilient to replay
attacks; 3) prevents attacks on the hopcount of harakiri messages by ensur-
ing network wide distribution; 4) increases resilience to battery exhaustion
attacks, 5) has binary accusation values. We refer to this scheme as basic
revocation scheme. Then, in Section 4.2, we show various ways to extend
the basic scheme such that the resulting schemes can provide more pertinent
security functionalities for di®erent applications.
4.1. Basic Revocation Scheme
The basic revocation scheme consists of four algorithms: Algorithm 1:
Neighborhood watch, Algorithm 2: Harakiri, Algorithm 3: Propagate, and Al-
gorithm 4: Update KRL. Algorithms 1, 2 and 4 each require the propagation
of the respective messages, respectively and thus all trigger Algorithm 3. An
overview of the key revocation scheme is depicted in Figure 1.
114.1.1. Algorithm 1: Neighborhood Watch
The neighborhood watch algorithm is a local monitoring scheme, in which
each node i monitors all neighbors in its one-hop neighborhood Ni;1. When-
ever i observes a suspicious neighbor j 2 N1;i, i sets ai
j;i = 1 . Every time
node i changes at least one accusation value ai
j;i from 0 to 1, i.e. from trusted
to malicious status, i creates an neighborhood watch message nmi;j for each
one-hop neighbor j 2 N1;i according to
nmi;j = (fKi;j(IDi;nmi;hopcount);(IDi;nmi;hopcount));8 j 2 N1;i: (5)
A neighborhood watch message nmi;j contains the identity of the sender, here
IDi, and the observations from i's neighborhood watch denoted as nmi. For
simplicity, we choose nmi = KRL
i, i.e. i submits its entire key revocation
list. More bandwidth e±cient solutions can be designed. The last ¯eld is the
hopcount that ensures that the message reaches all nodes in m-hop distance.
Therefore, node i initially sets hopcount = m. To avoid unauthorized or
modi¯ed accusations, accusation messages are protected by a MAC function
f(), where pairwise pre-shared keys Ki;j from (2) serve as MAC keys. After
computing all accusation messages, node i starts Algorithm 3 to propagate
them.
4.1.2. Algorithm 2: Harakiri
When a node i realizes that its private key di has been compromised, i
creates a harakiri message hmi with
hmi = (IDi;di;Qi;(tx;vi);\revoke"): (6)
The message contains the sender's identity (IDi), the compromised private
key di, the corresponding public key Qi, the expiry date and version number
of the public key (tx;vi), and a text string that marks the message as revo-
cation message. Upon creating harakiri message hmi, i starts Algorithm 3.
4.1.3. Algorithm 3: Propagate
In this algorithm nodes securely propagate accusations to their one-hop
neighbors. Accusation messages ami can be neighborhood watch messages
nmi;j (see (5)), harakiri messages hmi (see (6)), or update messages umi;j
(see (9)), i.e. ami 2 fnmi;j;hmi;umi;jg. The initiator of Algorithm 3, i.e.
sender i sends its accusation message(s) to all its one-hop neighbors j 2 N1;i.
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4.1.4. Algorithm 4: Update KRL
In this algorithm, node i updates its key revocation list KRL
i using the
received accusation messages amj. We distinguish between three types of
updates according to the received message amj and describe each update
process in the following paragraphs. The algorithm with all its processing
steps is illustrated in Figure 2.
Received amj = hmj. First, receiver i checks wether it has already re-
ceived that harakiri message. For example, this can be done by storing the
hash values of the last $ received harakiri messages. If the same message
has been previously received, i discards hmj and aborts the algorithm. Else,
i ¯rst needs to verify whether the message is authentic. It is not necessary
to check who sent the message, because in any case the public key that cor-
responds to the broadcasted private key dj should not be used any longer.
However, it needs to be veri¯ed whether the broadcasted private key dj cor-
responds to public key Qj and identity IDj. Therefore, a node i veri¯es
13whether
Ki;j = ^ e(dj;Qi) (7)
is true. If i is neither in possession of Ki;j nor Qj, i ¯rst computes Qj from the
received IDj, tj and vj according to (1) and checks whether the received IDj
and the computed Qj correspond to each other. If this check is successful,
i derives Ki;j according to (2). Finally, i checks whether (7) is true and if
successful, i updates its key revocation list KRL
i by setting accusation value
ai
j;j = 1. Hence, Condition 1 in (4) is satis¯ed and i sets Xi
j = 1. Finally,
node i starts Algorithm 3 with ami = hmj.
Received amj = nmj;i. When node i receives a neighborhood watch
message nmj;i, it needs to execute several veri¯cation and update steps. If
a step is successful, i continues with the next step, else i drops the packet
and aborts the algorithm. Upon receiving amj = nmj;i, node i performs the
following steps:
1. neighbor check: i checks whether sender j is a direct neighbor, i.e.
j 2 N1;i.
2. check trustworthiness: i checks whether it trusts j, i.e. Xi
j = 0.
3. verify message authenticity: i veri¯es the MAC of the received message
nmj;i using pre-shared key Ki;j.
4. expand key revocation list: Node i scans KRL
j for rows of nodes k = 2 Ni
and for any such k creates a new row ri
k in KRL
i, sets Ni := Ni +IDk
and ­i := ­i + 1.
5. copy direct accusations: i extracts column vector c
j
j from nmj to update
its own column vector ci
j in KRL
i. For the update, node i only copies
accusation values a
j
k;j = 1 to allow only transitions from 0 to 1. Upon
completion, node i sets the update °ag, i.e. update = true.
6. store reported accusations: i scans through all columns c
j
k with k 2
f1;:::;­jg in KRL
j and stores all columns c
j
k for which all following
conditions hold:
(a) k 6= i
(b) k 6= j
(c) Xi
k = 0
(d) k = 2 N1;i
Node i checks Conditions (a)-(d) for all k 2 f1;:::;­jg. If all condi-
tions are met for k, i stores c
j
k and increments counter rk. All other
14columns are discarded. We refer to the stored vectors as k-vectors. As
discussed in our trust model in Section 3.5, we need a minimum of "
received k-vectors from di®erent one-hop neighbors to establish trust in
the reported accusations of node k. If at least " k-vectors are collected,
i.e. rk ¸ ", i updates its KRL
i as described in the next step.
7. use accumulated k-vectors for update: Node i checks for all
k 2 f1;:::;­ig whether rk ¸ ". Whenever true node i updates the
k-vector in KRL
i. For an easier representation and without loss of
generality, we assume i stored rk column vectors c
j
k from rk one-hop
neighbors j with j 2 f1;:::;rkg in Step 6, with rk ¸ ". Each accusation
value ai
l;k with l 2 f1;:::;­ig in ci
k is computed from the majority vote
over all collected a
j
l;k, with
a
i
l;k =
½
1 if
Prk
j=1 a
j
l;k >
rk
2
ai
l;k else
; (8)
where j 2 f1;:::;rkg. Basically, if the majority of the accumulated
accusation values a
j
l;k against a node l equal 1, node i sets the value to
1. Otherwise, the accusation value in KRL
i remains unchanged. This
ensures that only transitions from 0 to 1 are allowed. Note that all
k-vectors that have been used for the KRL update are erased, whereas
\unused" k-vectors with rk < " remain in i's storage. If i updated at
least one k-vector in KRL
i, node i sets the update °ag update = true.
8. prepare update message: If update = true, which is always true for
ami = nmi;j, node i prepares an update message umi;j for all its one-
hop neighbors j 2 N1;i with
umi;j = (fKi;j(IDi;umi;hopcount);(IDi;umi;hopcount));8 j 2 N1;i:
(9)
The messages are constructed similar to the neighborhood watch mes-
sages nmi;j in (5). For simplicity, we assume umi = KRL
i, where more
bandwidth e±cient solutions such as only sending updated vectors are
possible. All messages umi;j for all j 2 N1;i serve as input to Algo-
rithm 3 and thus are propagated to i's one-hop neighborhood. After
triggering Algorithm 3, the update °ag is reset, i.e. update = false.
Received amj = umj;i. When node i receives a KRL update message
amj = umi;j from j, node i executes Steps 1-4 and 6-7 as described in the
15previous paragraph for amj = umi;j. If node i updated at least one of its
k-vectors, i.e. update = true and hopcount > 1, i creates an update messages
umi;j according to (9) for all j 2 N1;i with hopcount := hopcount ¡ 1, starts
Algorithm 3, and resets the update °ag.
4.2. Extensions of the Basic Revocation Scheme
In this section, we describe two classes of extensions to the presented
basic revocation scheme.
4.2.1. Key Escrow Prevention and Privacy Protection
The ¯rst class of extensions deal deals with the inherent key escrow prop-
erty of IBC schemes and other privacy related issues.
1. Distributed On-line KGC. Our scheme can be easily modi¯ed for
MANETs with distributed on-line KGCs, because the revocation scheme
remains unchanged while the distributed on-line KGC takes over the
task of key generation and distribution. For example, (k;n)-threshold
schemes can be used to distribute master key s to all network nodes
such that k D-KGCs can collaboratively generate and distribute (new)
private keys, as in [7, 13, 14, 20, 21].
2. Con¯dential Accusations. To avoid that (malicious) nodes can overhear
accusations, accusations can be encrypted, as suggested in [20]. For
accusation con¯dentiality, any symmetric encryption algorithm can be
used with a secret encryption key K0
i;j that is derived from the pre-
shared keys Ki;j in (2). In that case, all neighborhood watch and update
messages are encrypted and only sent to neighbors that are not accused
in these messages, e.g. nmi;j = (fKi;j(IDi;nmi);EK0
i;j(IDi;nmi));8 j 2
N1;i n fLg, where L is the set of accused neighbors.
3. Dedicated Key Pairs. Harakiri messages hmi (see (6)) contain private
keys di which a®ects the security of all previous messages that were
either signed under di or encrypted under Qi or Ki;j for any j 2 N.
To prevent misuses of self-revoked keys, we suggest using dedicated
private and public key pairs for di®erent purposes. For example, pub-
lic keys could contain a label that speci¯es the purpose of the keys,
e.g. Qi(tx;vi) = H1(IDijjtxjjvijjlabel); where label 2 f sign, encrypt,
revocationg. This format still allows nodes i to derive public keys Qj
and pre-shared keys Ki;j of other nodes j in a non-interactive fashion
while particular private keys can be revealed without revealing private
keys dedicated to other purposes.
164. Crypto Agility. The presented key revocation scheme can be adopted to
other cryptographic schemes, such as PKI and secret key based security
solutions, by adapting the respective system set up accordingly. The
actual revocation scheme algorithms 1-4 as well as security parameters
and the underlying trust model would remain the same.
4.2.2. Adaptive and Versatile Schemes
The second class of extensions further enhance the adaptability and ver-
satility of the basic scheme.
1. Regaining Trust. After a previously marked malicious node j behaves
well for a certain period of time TR, its neighbors i may update the
corresponding accusation values accordingly, e.g. reducing accusation
value ai
j;i by ¢a · 1. Note that this works better when accusation
values are real numbers.
2. Sleeping nodes. Sleeping cycles of nodes can be easily integrated into
the revocation scheme. Before going to sleep, nodes must inform their
neighbors to avoid being marked as malicious. After waking up, a node
can instantly continue its neighborhood watch and additionally request
updates from its one-hop neighbors.
3. Adapting Scheme to Hostile Environments. The presented key revo-
cation scheme can be adapted to many di®erent environments. For
instance in very hostile environments, all accusation values could be
initialized with ones, the majority vote could be computed di®erently,
and updates triggered by di®erent events. These parameters should be
selected according to the fraction of expected malicious nodes.
4. Adaptive Monitoring Schemes and Security Parameters. Sometimes it
might be advisable to adjust the system parameters in the running
system. For instance, some nodes might have a number of accusations
always just below threshold ±. In that case the threshold of these or
all nodes should be dropped accordingly at the next expiry interval.
In other cases it might be advisable to have an adaptive monitoring
scheme, e.g. some nodes might be at the edge of the network and do
not need to forward many packets. In that case, a monitoring scheme
that only monitors the number of forwarded packets is not su±cient.
It is advisable to have an adaptive monitoring scheme that implements
several kinds of metrics and thresholds that can be selected accord-
ing to some network parameters, such as network density, number of
neighbors, position in the network, etc..
175. Network-wide Revocations. The propagation range m can be removed
such that accusations are propagated throughout the entire network, as
it is done for harakiri messages. The disadvantages of this modi¯cation
are increased communication load and storage requirements. Hence,
m serves as performance parameter that should be selected according
to the number of malicious nodes, the mobility of malicious nodes,
available network bandwidth and power constraints of nodes.
6. Adversary Models. We treat the implemented monitoring scheme as a
black box with false positive and false negative rates ® and ¯, respec-
tively and specify neither how malicious behavior is de¯ned nor how
such behavior can be measured. This makes our revocation scheme
very versatile and suitable to thwart all types of existing as well as
potential future attacks. In order to thwart speci¯c malicious behav-
ior, the presented revocation scheme does not need to be modi¯ed and
only the monitoring scheme must be modeled accordingly. For instance,
if the adversary model describes DoS attacks, the monitoring scheme
could be set to detect large numbers of sent packets. If the adversary
model describes blackhole attacks, the monitoring scheme could be set
to check the number of dropped packets.
5. Security Analysis of Attacks by Outsiders and Non-colluding
Insiders
We assume that the underlying IBC scheme including the pre-shared
keys from (2) is secure and we limit our security analysis to the proposed key
revocation scheme.
5.1. Outsider Attacks
Message Fabrications and Modi¯cations: In the revocation scheme, all
neighborhood watch and update messages are protected with pre-shared keys
Ki;j. Thus the messages provide message authentication and integrity pro-
tection and can be neither fabricated nor modi¯ed by outsiders. On the other
hand, harakiri messages are not protected but contain private and public key
pairs. Hence, harakiri messages can only be created by insiders or adversaries
who compromised a node. Latter have no reason to send harakiri messages,
because it would render the key compromise useless.
Replay Attacks: An outsider may replay previously observed messages.
Note that receiving multiple copies of a message can also be caused by the
18multi-path propagations in MANETs, which may be considered as uninten-
tional replay attack.
Old public keys cannot be successfully replayed in the presented revoca-
tion scheme because they contain an expiry date and a version number and
thus cannot be used to replace newer keys. For the same reason, messages
can only be replayed in the same expiry interval (i.e. for (tx¡¢T) · t · tx),
because neighborhood watch, harakiri and update messages all contain keys
with expiry date tx. Now recall that accusation and thus revocation val-
ues can only be changed from 0 to 1 in a key revocation list unless a new
key is received or a new expiry interval starts, and each node has only one
vote towards the ± threshold. Hence, replayed harakiri messages, replayed
accusation messages containing more accusation values set to zero than in
the current KRL
i, as well as accusation values containing the same number
of values set to one, will be all discarded. On the other hand, replayed ac-
cusations cannot contain more ones, because such messages could have not
been previously observed by an adversary. However, replayed reported accu-
sations that have been previously counted towards the majority vote, may
be counted again as part of a new majority vote computation. However, the
majority vote only allows changes from 0 to 1 (see (8)) and is furthermore
protected by security parameter ", i.e. a replayed message still only counts
1=" towards one accusation value.
A similar discussion applies to messages that arrive out of order (mali-
ciously or unintentionally). For example, if ¯rst an accusation value set to
one is received and later an older message containing the same accusation
value set to zero, the second received message is discarded.
Battery Exhaustion: An outsider could attempt draining a node's battery
in a so-called battery exhaustion attack [18] by repeatedly sending messages
that cause a node to perform demanding computational operations. The im-
pact of these attacks on our revocation scheme is limited, because replayed
harakiri messages will be discarded and nodes only accept accusation mes-
sages from trusted one-hop neighbors. These checks are very e±cient (a
table look up) and thus cannot be exploited to drain a battery. If an adver-
sary spoofs the identity of a trusted one-hop neighbor, the attack would be
detected when verifying the authenticity of the ¯rst bogus message. Here,
the veri¯cation costs are rather small for neighborhood watch and update
messages (namely a MAC computation) and more demanding for verifying
harakiri messages (up to two pairing computations). The attack cannot be
successfully continued if the monitoring scheme is set to mark the sender's
19identity as malicious after several failed attempts.
Compromised Nodes: Under the assumption that the underlying cryp-
tographic scheme is secure, an outsider adversary can only obtain keying
material by compromising a node. The adversary can use the compromised
keys until they are revoked or expired because outsiders cannot request new
keys for a compromised node. Hence, an adversary can only launch an at-
tack from the time a node is compromised tc until the key is revoked at tr,
i.e. during a time interval ¢Tattack = tr ¡ tc, where 0 · ¢Tattack · ¢T. In
the remaining security analysis we show how the security parameters of our
revocation scheme should be selected to minimize the time it takes to detect
a malicious node and revoke its keys. Most importantly, a single node cannot
force false accusations due to security parameters ± and ". We will discuss
this in detail in the next section for non-colluding insiders.
5.2. Non-colluding Insiders
Sybil Attacks: Malicious nodes could try to bypass security parameter ±
by fabricating ± di®erent identities in a so-called Sybil attack [8]. Our scheme
uses ID-based public keys of a ¯xed format, i.e. upon identifying to the KGC,
a node can only obtain one possible valid private key for a speci¯c expiry
date. Hence, Sybil attacks requiring keying material are not applicable in
our scheme. In another type of Sybil attack that does not require keying
material, an adversary j creates ± rows in its key revocation list for ± virtual
nodes V = fv1;v2;:::;v±g and then sets a
j
i;x = 1 for all x 2 V . However, the
reported accusations received from j are only accepted by a node i, if at least
" ¡ 1 other reported accusations from the same ± nodes in S are received.
Hence, the attack requires at least " colluding one-hop neighbors and will be
covered in Section 6.
In another Sybil attack described in [17], an adversary replicates nodes.
However, such adversaries do not gain any advantage in our revocation
scheme, because only one accusation is counted for each node with the same
identity.
Malicious Nodes: A malicious node k could attempt to impersonate an-
other node i. However, k's keying material cannot be used to obtain i's
keying material. Hence, the only way to impersonate another node i is com-
promising this node (see previous section).
An undetected malicious node attempting to launch a battery exhaustion
attack, could send messages that would be initially accepted because they
pass the veri¯cations. However, eventually the attack would be detected.
20A single malicious node k may send more than one accusation against the
same node j, however each receiver i only stores one accusation value ai
j;k.
In other words, each node has only one vote towards the ± threshold.
Malicious nodes cannot simply drop accusations against themselves, be-
cause this will be detected in the neighborhood watch scheme. Besides,
accusations are broadcasted and, thus, still reach other nodes, even if one
of the propagation paths is broken. Attempts of malicious nodes to modify
accusations against themselves are prevented by using integrity protected ac-
cusations. An adversary could modify its own key revocation list. However,
the impact of this attack is limited by security parameters ± and ". In partic-
ular, a malicious node's false direct accusations count only 1=± towards the
±-threshold for a revocation; while ± false reported accusations count only
1=" towards the "-threshold of reported accusations. Hence without collusion
a malicious node cannot force the revocation of a node.
Roaming Adversaries: Whenever a node's accusation count approaches
±, that node may move to a new neighborhood, say at least 2m hops away,
hoping that nodes there have not received the accusations against it. We refer
to these kind of malicious nodes as roaming adversaries. A roaming adversary
k's new one-hop neighbors will eventually detect k's malicious behavior and
thus k needs to move again before its key is revoked. Lets assume nodes
are uniformly distributed and each routing hop is over a distance R. Then,
the speed S that is necessary for roaming adversaries to travel to a new
neighborhood in 2 hop distance before their current keys expire at time tx is
S ¸
2mR
tx ¡ t
:
Note that t is the current time and thus tx ¡ t · ¢T. We can observe that
by selecting m su±ciently large and the expiry intervals ¢T small, roaming
adversaries have to travel fast to escape the revocation of their keys. Due to
the dynamics of MANETs, moving 2m hops does not guarantee that nodes in
the new neighborhood have not received some previous accusations. Hence,
adversaries cannot remain at the same location for a long period of time and
need to travel faster each time they change the neighborhood with t advanc-
ing tx. Finally, the threat posed by mobile adversaries can be completely
thwarted by encrypting all accusations, as described in Section 4.2, because
adversaries would not learn about the number of accusations against them.
Falsely Accused Nodes: For the remainder of the security analysis, we
assume that all nodes implement the same monitoring scheme and introduce
21Table 2: List of Notations for Security Analysis
Hi, ni
h = jHij Set & number of i's honest one-hop neighbors
Fi, ni
f = jFij Set & number of i's falsely marked honest one-hop neighbors
Mi, ni
m = jMij Set & number of i's malicious one-hop neighbors
Ui, ni
u = jUij Set & number of i's malicious undetected one-hop neighbors
C, nc = jCj Set & number of colluding nodes
£i Set of i's trusted one-hop neighbors
some notations, summarized in Table 2. Lets Hi denote i's honest one-hop
neighbors, with jHij = ni
h, and Mi i's malicious one-hop neighbors, with
jMij = ni
m. That follows that N1;i = Hi
S
Mi, where Hi
T
Mi = ; and thus
¾i = ni
h + ni
m. Furthermore, Fi denotes i's honest one-hop neighbors that
have been falsely marked as malicious by i, with jFij = ni
f, and Ui denotes
i's undetected malicious one-hop neighbors, with jUij = ni
u. Hence, Fi µ Hi
and Ui µ Mi. Finally, the colluding nodes are denoted as C with jCj = nc.
In our analysis of colluding one-hop neighbors, we consider the case that all
undetected malicious nodes collude, i.e. C = Ui and nc = ni
u.
We can observe that false positive rate ® causes a node to falsely mark
ni
f = ®ni
h of its honest one-hop neighbors as malicious. Note that falsely
accused nodes do not directly pose a security threat. However, besides the
inconvenience false accusations may cause the accused nodes, a large num-
ber of falsely accused nodes could stop the revocation scheme from work-
ing e±ciently or in the worst case from working at all. To be able to re-
voke keys, a node i must receive at least ± (direct and/or reported) accu-
sations from trusted nodes. Each node i trusts all its one-hop neighbors
n 2 £i = (Hi n Fi)
S
Ui, which follows that the number of trusted one-hop
neighbors is j£ij = (1¡®)ni
h+¯ni
m. To enable key revocations by exclusively
direct accusations j£ij ¸ ± must hold. However, to enable the acceptance of
reported accusations (which is necessary to revoke keys from nodes that are
more than 2 hops away) and in the case that ± > ¾i, the false positive rate
® of a revocation scheme must satisfy
ni
h + ¯ni
m ¡ "
ni
h
¸ ®:
226. Security Analysis of Attacks by Colluding Nodes
We now analysis the resilience of the scheme to colluding nodes. In par-
ticular, we show how security parameters ± and ", as well as false negative
rate ¯ should be chosen to prevent such attacks.
6.1. Colluding One-hop Neighbors
De¯nition 5 (Successful Attack by Colluding One-hop Neighbors).
A group of nc · ¾i colluding one-hop neighbors can convince an honest node
i to mark the key of another honest node j 2 N as revoked in KRL
i, i.e.
Xi
j = 1.
A monitoring scheme with false negative rate ¯ leads to ni
u = ¯ni
m unde-
tected malicious nodes in i's one-hop neighborhood. Hence, up to ni
u one-hop
neighbors u 2 Ui may collude to launch an attack. Colluding one-hop neigh-
bors u can launch two types of attacks: A. Altering direct accusations, i.e.
nodes u alter their own accusations as part of their propagated neighborhood
watch messages, and B. Altering reported accusations, i.e. nodes u alter re-
ported accusations of nodes that are 2 or more hops away.
Altering direct accusations: Recall that ± accusations revoke a key (see
Condition 3 in (4)) and that node i copies the direct accusations of all trusted
one-hop neighbors j 2 £i (see Step 5 in Algorithm 4). We now consider the
following attack by colluding nodes u 2 Ui:
² each node u 2 Ui sets au
j;u = 1 for an honest node j 2 N and sends a
neighborhood watch message
Upon receiving nmu;i, i uses u's neighborhood watch vectors cu
u to update ci
u
in KRL
i. In that way, node i updates ni
u vectors in its revocation list, each
containing ai
j;u = 1. Thus, there are at least ni
u accusations against node j
in KRL
i. Hence, if the following inequality
n
i
u ¸ ±
holds, node i will revoke node j's key. This result is not surprising because ±
is the threshold for our revocation scheme, and thus ± malicious undetected
one-hop neighbors can revoke the key of any j 2 N. The described attack
can be prevented by selecting ± and ¯ such that ni
u < ±. We know that
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Figure 3: Attacks by Colluding Nodes: (a) One-hop Neighbors Altering Reported Accu-
sations, (b) Two-hop Neighbors Altering Direct Accusations.
ni
m · ¾i, thus attacks by altering direct accusations can only succeed if
¯¾i ¸ ±. Hence, if we select ¯ and ± such that
¯ <
±
¾i
; (10)
the described attack is completely prevented. We can observe that by se-
lecting ± ¸ ¾i, (10) always holds because ¯ < 1 for any monitoring scheme.
In most monitoring schemes ¯ typically ranges from 0.01 to 0.1 and thus ±
can be selected smaller than ¾i, which does not put many restrictions on the
parameter selection.
Altering reported accusations: In another attack by colluding one-hop
neighbors u 2 Ui, the adversaries alter reported accusations exploiting the
majority rule (see (8)) that is applied by node i to derive column vectors ci
k,
with k 2 N nN1;i. From Steps 6 and 7 in Algorithm 4, we can observe that at
least b
rk
2 +1c trusted nodes are necessary to gain majority and thus determine
the accusation values in ci
k. In the attack, colluding nodes manipulate their
submitted k-vectors. The colluding nodes u 2 Ui execute the following steps
to launch an attack of type B:
² each u 2 Ui selects ¢ nodes in N n N1;i, which is denoted as V , i.e.
V ½ N n N1;i and ¢ = jV j.
24² node u sets au
j;v = 1 for all v 2 V , and sends an update message umu;i.
Upon receiving all ni
u update messages umu;i, node i updates the accu-
sation value ai
j;v with ai
j;v = 1 for all v 2 V , if the received k-vectors from
the colluders form the majority, i.e. if ni
u >
rk
2 (see (8)). If the number of
accusations reaches threshold ±, i revokes j's key with Xi
j = 1. Note that
the minimum number of colluding nodes needed to force the acceptance of
the reported accusations is rk = ". Hence the minimum number of colluding
nodes u 2 Ui is ni
u = b"
2 + 1c. In the remainder of our security analysis we
use ³ = b"
2 + 1c. The attack is illustrated in Fig. 3-(a) and we summarize
the conditions for a successful Attack B below:
1. all v 2 V are trusted by node i, i.e. Xi
v = 0 for all v 2 V
2. ¢ ¸ ±
3. ni
u ¸ ³
Condition 1 is a requirement for any group of colluding nodes and thus
assumed to be true in this attack analysis. Condition 2 is also generally true
because ± is typically chosen a lot smaller than ­ ¡¾i and u can choose any
node in more than 2 hop distance or even fabricate nodes (see Sybil attack).
Therefore we focus on Condition 3. Recall that ni
m · ¾i. Hence if we choose
¯ and " such that
¯ <
1
¾i
b
"
2
+ 1c; (11)
the described attack is prevented. We would like to emphasize that (11)
re°ects the best possible scenario from the attackers' point of view, in which
exactly d"
2 ¡ 1e honest one-hop neighbors report k-vectors. Less or more
honest nodes would both require a larger number of colluding nodes ni
u,
because rk < " in the ¯rst case, whereas ni
u must maintain the majority in
the latter case.
Note that 1 · " · ¾i. Hence, selecting large " relaxes the condition
on the accuracy of the monitoring scheme while reducing the e±ciency and
functionality of our revocation scheme. However, in any case " ¸ 1 and thus
selecting ¯ < 1
¾i ensures that Attack B is prevented for any selection of ".
Since ¾i varies for di®erent neighborhoods an average value ¾ should be esti-
mated for the network before selecting a monitoring scheme with appropriate
¯.
Remark 1. Colluding one-hop neighbors can combine Attacks A and B, i.e.
alter direct and reported accusations. In that case only ¢ = ± ¡ni
u k-vectors
25must be manipulated, because the colluders send ni
u altered direct accusations.
Hence, the described attack modi¯es Conditions 1 and 2 but not Condition 3
and the attack can still be prevented by selecting ¯ and " such that (11) holds.
6.2. Colluding l-hop Neighbors
We now analyze attacks by colluding l-hop neighbors with l > 1.
De¯nition 6 (Successful Attack by Colluding l-hop Neighbors). A
group of nc · ­ ¡ ¾i colluding l-hop neighbors, with l > 1, can convince an
honest node i to mark the key of another honest node j 2 N as revoked in
KRL
i, i.e. Xi
j = 1.
Altering direct accusations: We ¯rst consider an attack by colluding two-
hop neighbors, i.e. l = 2, in which the colluders alter their direct accusations.
These altered accusations are received by the one-hop neighbors of the col-
luders, which in turn report the (altered) accusations to node i. We assume
the following attacking scenario:
² a group of colluding 2-hop neighbors C, with jCj = nc and C ½ (N2;i n
N1;i)
² a group of nodes O that are one-hop neighbors of node i as well as of
all nodes c 2 C, i.e. O ½ N1;i and O ½ N1;c for all c 2 C
Furthermore, we assume that all nodes o 2 O faithfully execute the revoca-
tion algorithms. The attack consists of two phases:
Phase 1.
² each c 2 C sets ac
j;c = 1 and sends a neighborhood watch message
² each receiver o 2 O updates its KRL
o with ao
j;c = 1 if Xo
c = 0
Phase 2.
² each o 2 O sends an update message reporting the altered accusations,
i.e. ao
j;c = 1 for all c 2 C
² node i updates its KRL
i if it received at least rc > " c-vectors. In that
case the majority vote forces i to set ai
j;c = 1 for all c 2 C. And if the
number of collected accusations is larger than ±, i revokes j's key
26The attack is illustrated in Fig. 3-(b) and works if the following three
conditions hold:
1. jCj ¸ ±
2. jOj ¸ ³
3. all o 2 O mark each c 2 C as honest, i.e. Xo
c = 0 for all o 2 O and
c 2 C
We assume the ¯rst two conditions to be true and analyze Condition 3, i.e. the
probability that each colluder c 2 C remains undetected by the monitoring
scheme of each of its one-hop neighbors o 2 O. For an easier representation
and without loss of generality, we denote the one-hop neighbors as O =
fo1;o2;:::;o³g and the colluding adversaries as C = fc1;c2;:::;c±g. The
probability that one adversary cr with r 2 f1;:::;±g remains undetected by
one neighbor os with s 2 f1;:::;³g is
¯nos
m
¾os
:
The probability that cr remains undetected by all considered ³ one-hop neigh-
bors o 2 O is
¯³no1
mno2
m ¢¢¢n
o³
m
¾o1¾o2 ¢¢¢¾o³
:
Now each of the ± colluding attackers cr must fool all one-hop neighbors
o 2 O, which leads to probability
µ
¯³no1
mno2
m ¢¢¢n
o³
m
¾o1¾o2 ¢¢¢¾o³
¶±
:
Lets assume that all nodes os have approximately the same number of one-
hop neighbors ¾ and approximately the same number of malicious one-hop
neighbors nm, then the probability of a successful attack by ± colluding two-
hop neighbors c 2 C is µ
¯nm
¾
¶±³
: (12)
We know that nm · ¾ and ¯ < 1, i.e. the term in brackets is smaller than
1. Furthermore, with typical values of ¯ ranging between 0:01 up to 0:1, the
probability of a successful attack becomes negligible for small ¯ and larger
exponents.
27The described attack assumes that node i receives a total of " c-vectors,
where ³ contain the altered accusations. However, if node i does not re-
ceive any other c-vectors, the colluders must manipulate " c-vectors and thus
\convince" " as opposed to ³ one-hop neighbors o, which further reduces the
likelihood of the described attack.
Altering reported accusations: To increase their chance of a successful
attack, the colluders in 2-hop distance could alter reported accusations of
neighbors in (l > 2)-hop distance. In that attack, assuming the best possible
case from the attackers' perspective, ³ instead of ± colluders are su±cient to
launch the described attack. However, with
µ
¯nm
¾
¶³2
(13)
the probability of a successful attack is only slightly larger and still negligible.
We now argue that the described attack for l = 2 is the best possible
attack for colluding nodes in l-hop distance, with l > 1. Colluders must
always fool at least ³ one-hop neighbors. Then in the best possible case
(from the colluders' perspective), the altered accusations propagate through
the network. Consequently, the probability of a successful attack by l-hop
colluders can never exceed the probability in (13).
7. Discussions and Conclusions
In this article, we present a parameterized trust model and security
analysis framework that can be applied to any monitoring-based scheme in
MANETs or other decentralized networks. This work is the ¯rst to take the
false positive and false negative error rates, ® and ¯, of monitoring schemes
into account and shows how they a®ect the functionality and security of
monitoring-based schemes in MANETs. Our extensive security analysis con-
siders a wide range of attacks. For example, we show how security thresholds
± and " can be utilized to thwart Sybil and replay attacks while cryptographi-
cally protected messages can be used to prevent some other common attacks.
We derive bounds and relations for security parameters ± and " and system
parameters ® and ¯ to counteract attacks by colluders. In addition, we
show how the power of roaming adversaries can be restricted by choosing
parameters ¢T and m accordingly or encrypting accusation messages.
We use these results to design a practical decentralized key revocation
scheme that facilitates the detection of malicious nodes in MANETs and
28revokes their keys. The introduced parameters and black-box approach of
the monitoring scheme, make our revocation scheme scalable in security and
performance as well as adaptable to the hostility of implementation environ-
ments and expected attacks. In addition, the presented revocation scheme
algorithms can be seamlessly integrated into any pairing-based IBC security
solution for MANETs and can be adapted to PKI and secret key schemes.
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